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WHITT v. HARRIS TEETER, INC.: TAKE THIS DOCTRINE AND
SHOVE IT - RECOGNIZING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
IN NORTH CAROLINA
GEMMA SALUTA*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2004, the North Carolina Court of Appeals recog-
nized the doctrine of constructive discharge in a wrongful termination
action where the termination contravenes public policy. This recogni-
tion expands employer liability for wrongful discharge in cases where
the employer intentionally creates such a poor work environment that
it effectively forces the worker to quit. This note will explore the his-
tory of constructive discharge in wrongful termination cases in North
Carolina, the reasoning behind the case of Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc.,'
the ability of North Carolina courts to recognize the doctrine, and the
adoption of the Fourth Circuit's constructive discharge elements by
the North Carolina Court of Appeals. This note will further argue
against the automatic adoption of the Fourth Circuit's strict standards
for constructive discharge.
BACKGROUND
North Carolina is an employment at-will state: "[A]bsent an em-
ployment contract for a definite period of time, both employer and
employee are generally free to terminate their association at any time
and without reason."2 Thus, an employee without a definite term of
employment is typically an employee at-will and may be discharged
without reason.3 In 1989, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., held that an employer would
be liable for terminating an employee for a reason that contravenes
public policy.4 The court defined public policy as "the principle of law
which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency
* Gemma Saluta is a second year student in the evening program at North Carolina Cen-
tral University School of Law.
1. Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
2. Gravitte v. Mitsubishi Semiconductor Am., Inc., 428 S.E.2d 254, 258 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (quoting Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
3. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (N.C. 1989) (quoting Still v. Lance, 182
S.E.2d 403 (N.C. 1971)).
4. Id. at 447.
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to be injurious to the public or against the public good."5 Sexual har-
assment as well as racial, sexual, and disability discrimination are typi-
cal examples of public policy principles that bring about wrongful
discharge claims.
However, if a plaintiff resigned from her employment, she could not
bring a claim for wrongful discharge.6 Thus, an employer could create
intolerable working conditions to compel an employee's resignation
and not have to worry that the aggrieved employee might bring a
wrongful discharge claim. To counter such abuses, ten of the eleven
other states to consider such an issue have extended the public policy
exception to at-will employees to prohibit constructive discharge.7
Further, constructive discharge is recognized in federal Title VII
cases.
8
Constructive discharge is not its own separate cause of action; the
doctrine merely allows injured parties to sue on a wrongful discharge
claim when they have quit under certain circumstances. Just as an
employer can fire an employee legally, an employer can constructively
discharge an employee legally as well.
Before Whitt, North Carolina courts had not recognized construc-
tive discharge for employment at-will relationships.9 However, the
North Carolina courts had "recognized the validity of a claim for con-
structive discharge 'in the context of interpreting whether constructive
termination by [a plaintiff's] employer triggered the termination pay-
ment provision of [an] employment contract.""'  In transitioning
from the employment contract with durational terms to the employ-
ment at-will scenario, three key cases provided the basis for the rea-
soning in the Whitt decision.
In Coman, the plaintiff was a long distance truck driver who was
ordered by his employer to drive over the maximum hours allowed by
5. Id. at 447 n.2 (quoting Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959)).
6. Gravitte, 428 S.E.2d at 258.
7. Whitt, 598 S.E.2d at 157; Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (Ark. 1988);
Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 241 Cal. Rptr. 916, 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Seery v.
Yale-New Haven Hosp., 554 A.2d 757, 761 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604
N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000); Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1203 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984); Bell v. Dynamite Foods, 969 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Barker v.
State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 468 (Okla. 2001); Dalby v. Sisters of Providence, 865 P.2d 391, 394-
95 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 423 S.E.2d
547, 558 (W. Va. 1992); Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 464 (Wis. 2000);
but see Grey v. First Nat'l Bank, 523 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (rejecting a claim for
constructive discharge).
8. EEOC v. Tar Heel Capital, Inc., No. 1-98CV84, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22268, at *7
(W.D.N.C Dec. 3, 1998) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986)).
9. Graham v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 465 S.E.2d 558, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
10. Beck v. City of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 183, 190 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Doyle v.
Asheville Orthopaedic Assocs., P.A., 557 S.E.2d 577, 579 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
2004]
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federal and state regulations.'1 Upon his refusal to violate these regu-
lations, his employer informed him that his wages would be reduced
by one-half. 12 The court found this reduction to be "tantamount to a
discharge of [the] plaintiff."' 3 The employer's directive to exceed the
hours prescribed by federal and state regulations was illegal and con-
trary to public policy.' 4 The court reasoned that
[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no
reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to
terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that con-
travenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage
and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to
discourage and prevent.15
Thus, the court found there was a public policy exception to the em-
ployment at-will doctrine.' 6
In Graham v. Hardee's Food System, Inc., the plaintiff, Graham,
claimed that district manager Ronald Rogers harassed her through his
unwanted physical contact, sexual advances and inappropriate com-
ments. v Because of this harassment, Graham wanted to hold their
mutual employer, Hardee's, liable for negligent supervision and reten-
tion, wrongful discharge, and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.'8 Although the plaintiff claimed that her actions against
Hardee's were independent from her claims against Rogers, both the
trial court and the appellate court found the claims against Hardee's
to be derivative. 9 Thus, the appellate court confirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for Hardee's because Graham's
second voluntary dismissal against Rogers barred Graham's derivative
claims against Hardee's itself.2°
Although Graham's wrongful discharge claim was improper,2' the
court, assuming, arguendo, considered her claim for constructive dis-
11. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 445-46 (N.C. 1989).
12. Id. at 446.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 447.
15. Id. (quoting Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)).
16. Id.
17. Graham v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 465 S.E.2d 558, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
18. Id. at 560.
19. Id.
20. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) (2004) ("[A] notice of dismissal operates
as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court
of this or any other state or of the United States, an action based on or including the same
claim."). Because the appellate court decided the action based upon procedural rules, the
court's opinion contains very little factual content.
21. Graham, 465 S.E.2d at 561 ("[The plaintiff had] to prove the discharge was in contra-
vention of North Carolina public policy or statute. The only allegations made by the plaintiff,
which could show a violation of public policy or statute involved the claims against Rogers for
which it has been judicially determined he is not liable.") (citation omitted).
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charge.22 The court used the Fourth Circuit's constructive discharge
standard that a plaintiff "must demonstrate that the employer deliber-
ately made working conditions intolerable and thereby forced [the
plaintiff] to quit."'23 Deliberateness is found only if the "actions com-
plained of were intended by the employer as an effort to force the
employee to quit."' 24 Using this standard, the Graham court could
find no evidence of either intolerable conditions or deliberateness by
Hardee's. 2 1
In Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc., the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the termination of the plaintiff's employment
based on a positive reading of a drug test did not constitute a wrongful
discharge simply because the drug test was not performed consistently
with a state statute. 26 The plaintiff claimed that the employer's use of
a non-approved laboratory violated Section 95-230 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes.27 The plaintiff argued that by violating the
statue, the employer violated public policy. The court recognized that
the statute reflected public policy but found that the termination itself
must be motivated by an unlawful reason or purpose that is against
public policy. 28 The court found no evidence that the employer acted
for an unlawful reason and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.29 The essential part of Garner for constructive discharge
purposes, although dicta, is the court's characterization of the Coman
facts. In summarizing the facts of Coman, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court stated, "[t]he plaintiff refused to [violate the regula-
tions], and his pay was reduced by fifty percent, which amounted to a
constructive discharge."30 By characterizing the facts of Coman as
amounting to constructive discharge, the North Carolina Supreme
Court indirectly asserted that constructive discharge would be a viable
claim in North Carolina.
THE CASE
The plaintiff, Wendy Whitt, worked as a cashier at a Harris Teeter
grocery store in Kernersville, North Carolina.31 Beginning in July
1999, one of the plaintiff's co-employees, Randy Shultz, began to sex-
22. Id. at 560.
23. Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 561.
26. Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 438, 439 (N.C. 1999).
27. Id. at 441.
28. Id. at 442.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
31. Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 151, 153 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
20041
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [2004], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss1/6
84 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:80
ually harass her at work.3 2 The plaintiff asked Shultz to stop and in-
formed him that she was married. 33 The sexual harassment included
sexual comments, touching without consent, sexual gestures, and
threats.34 Such comments included:
Let's go get naked and rub down in baby oil; That bright polish you're
wearing is giving me a hard-on; I bet you could f-k like hell when
you're that mad; If I catch you bent over like that again I might have
to come and throw my rod; and If I'm Santa Claus, I have a lifetime
lollipop when you want to sit on my lap.35
On October 26, 1999, the plaintiff reported Shultz to Harris Teeter
management.3 6 The management met with the plaintiff that day to
discuss the alleged harassment.37 A few days later, Shultz was pro-
moted to a manager-trainee and was relocated to another store.38
Shultz still visited the store and continued his harassment, which
grew to include phone calls at her home and stalking as she left the
company parking lot.39 On November 22, 1999, the Harris Teeter
field specialist "met with the plaintiff and informed her that the inves-
tigation was over, that Schultz had denied everything, and that she
could not corroborate [her] allegations."4 The specialist gave the
plaintiff a copy of the Harris Teeter sexual harassment policy."a After
that meeting, the plaintiff reported to her store manager that Shultz
was still making the sexual comments, stalking her, following her
home, physically touching her, and making threatening phone calls.a2
The store manager replied, "harshly and unconcerned, 'Wendy, what
do you want me to do about it?' 4 3
In November of 1999, while standing at the time clock, Shultz ap-
proached the plaintiff and pressed his entire body next to hers and
reached for her breasts."a The plaintiff "slung him off."' 45 The plain-
tiff again contacted the field specialist, who informed her that the mat-
ter had been "thoroughly investigated" and the investigation was
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 153-154.
35. Id. at 153.
36. Id. at 153-154.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 154.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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complete.46 As a result, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.47
Between the third week of November 1999 and the end of Decem-
ber 1999, Harris Teeter reduced the plaintiff's employment hours from
thirty-seven to twenty-seven hours per week. At this point, the
"[p]laintiff was experiencing panic attacks, crying spells, suicidal
thoughts, depression, withdrawal, insomnia, nightmares, nervousness
and felt 'hopeless, helpless, and just totally degraded."' 48 The manag-
ers started reporting that her cash registers were coming up short.49
The plaintiff also asserted that the managers would chastise her in
front of employees and customers, in violation of store policy.5" On
February 22, 2000, the plaintiff resigned.51 Upon tendering her resig-
nation, the assistant manager proclaimed, "Well, we figured this is
[sic] going to happen. 52
The plaintiff brought suit in Forsyth County Superior Court on No-
vember 20, 2000.51 The complaint included intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims against both Shultz and Harris Teeter and a
claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against Harris
Teeter.54
Denying a motion for summary judgment, the trial court allowed
the plaintiff to proceed with her wrongful discharge claim. It recog-
nized that "if an employee is forced to quit because of emotional dis-
tress caused by unlawful conduct of which the employer is on notice,
then the court discerns no reason why she should not be entitled to
assert a claim of constructive wrongful discharge."55
The jury trial commenced on February 11, 2002.56 At the close of
all the evidence, Harris Teeter's motion for directed verdict was
granted in part, dismissing the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim.57
On February 27, 2002, the jury returned a verdict against Shultz for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded damages of
twenty dollars.58 The jury did not find Harris Teeter liable. The plain-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 158.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 161.
52. Id. at 154.
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id.
55. Record at 48, Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 03-
335).
56. Whitt, 598 S.E.2d at 153.
57. Id.
58. Defendant-Appellee Harris Teeter, Inc.'s Brief at 3, Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 598
S.E.2d 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 03-335).
2004]
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tiff appealed the motion for directed verdict that dismissed the wrong-
ful discharge claim against Harris Teeter.59
In North Carolina, termination for reporting sexual harassment
contravenes public policy and may be a basis for a wrongful discharge
claim.6° In applying the facts of the case, the court of appeals found
that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate her
termination was based on sexual harassment:
(1) she was sexually harassed in the workplace by a fellow employee;
(2) she repeatedly reported such harassment to Defendant;
(3) Defendant promoted the employee responsible for the sexual
harassment;
(4) the sexual harassment continued after Plaintiff reported the be-
havior to Defendant;
(5) Defendant reduced Plaintiff's employment hours by ten hours per
week after she reported the harassment;
(6) Plaintiff developed depression and other psychological conditions
as a result of the sexual harassment, Defendant's failure to effec-
tively address such harassment, and Defendant's actions following
the report of sexual harassment; and
(7) Plaintiff's condition ultimately forced her to resign from her em-
ployment with Defendant.61
The court of appeals began by considering whether constructive dis-
charge should be recognized in cases of wrongful termination against
public policy. It established that the North Carolina Supreme Court
"implicitly recognized the viability" of a constructive discharge claim
in Coman.62 Highlighting the North Carolina Supreme Court's lan-
guage that the reduction in pay was "tantamount to a discharge, 63 the
court of appeals asserted that the North Carolina Supreme Court
"confirmed this interpretation" through the language in Garner, which
described Coman's reduction in pay as "constructive discharge. '
The court also used the principles found in Coman to support the
claim of wrongful discharge where termination is constructive: "A dif-
ferent interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which
law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent. '65 The
court of appeals also highlighted Coman's recognition that "[b]ad
faith conduct should not be tolerated in employment relations, just as
it is not accepted in other commercial relationships."66
59. Id. at 4.
60. Whitt, 598 S.E.2d at 155; See Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d 403, 407 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002); See Phillips v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 349, 352-353 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
61. Whitt, 598 S.E.2d at 156.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (N.C. 1989)).
64. Id. (quoting Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 438, 440 (N.C. 1999)).
65. Id. at 157 (quoting Coman, 381 S.E.2d at 447).
66. Id. (quoting Coman, 381 S.E.2d at 448).
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The court of appeals further recognized that common law public
policy-based constructive discharge claims have been recognized in
several other jurisdictions across the country.67 The court found the
explanation from Beye v. Bureau of National Affairs persuasive:
The law is not entirely blind, however. It is able, in most instances, to
discard form for substance, to reject sham for reality. It therefore rec-
ognizes the concept of "constructive discharge;" in a proper case, it
will overlook the fact that a termination was formally effected by a
resignation if the record shows that the resignation was indeed an in-
voluntary one, coerced by the employer.68
Due to these reasons, the court of appeals concluded, "North Carolina
recognizes the claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
where termination is constructive. "69
The court then evaluated whether the facts presented by the plain-
tiff were sufficient to support a claim of constructive discharge. Be-
cause this was an appeal of a directed verdict, the evidence was taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court of appeals fol-
lowed the Graham court's use of the Fourth Circuit's standard: the
plaintiff "must demonstrate that the employer deliberately made
working conditions intolerable and thereby forced [the plaintiff] to
quit."'70 Deliberateness is found only if the "actions complained of
were intended by the employer as an effort to force the employee to
quit."7 " Intolerability is measured "by the objective standard of
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have
felt compelled to resign."72
The majority found that the plaintiff was able to demonstrate that
Harris Teeter's acts were deliberate for the following reasons: the inef-
fective handling of the sexual harassment complaints; the promotion
of Schultz after being informed about his offensive behavior; the op-
portunities Schultz had to come back to the store despite the plain-
tiff's complaints; the store manager's refusal to help; the reduction of
hours; and, upon tendering her resignation, the store manager saying,
"We figured this would happen." 73 Upon review of these facts, the
court also concluded that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to
67. Id. (quoting 1 LEX. K. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 6.06[2] (Matthew Bender & Co.,
Inc. 2003) (1984)).
68. Id. (quoting Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984)).
69. Id. at 158.
70. Id. (quoting Graham v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 465 S.E.2d 558, 560 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996)).
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992)).
73. Id.
2004]
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show that the work conditions were intolerable. 74 Thus, the plaintiff's
evidence was sufficient to present a question for the jury as to the
defendant's liability for wrongful discharge under the constructive dis-
charge doctrine.75
In his dissent, Judge McCullough interpreted the Coman decision
narrowly, following the Coman court's presentation of the issue: "Our
present task is to determine whether we should adopt a public policy
exception to the employee-at-will doctrine. '76 Thus, from the dis-
sent's point of view, the Coman reasoning should only be used in cases
that deal directly with public policy exceptions to the employment at-
will doctrine. In addition, the dissent opined that there are two dif-
ferent scenarios in which to apply constructive discharge. Judge Mc-
Cullough asserted that the wrongful discharge in Coman is different
from the wrongful discharge in Graham.77 The wrongful discharge
based on Coman requires some affirmative demand by an employer
for an employee to violate public policy.78 A claim based on Graham,
however, is a hostile environment claim.79 The dissent would require
that constructive discharge claims only be allowed when the employer
commands his employees to violate public policy; in contrast, when
the employer creates a hostile work environment, constructive dis-
charge would not be applied, or at least would be applied with differ-
ent standards. Because the majority based its finding on Coman, the
dissent argued that the wrongful discharge claim should not be recog-
nized in the present case because Whitt's claim is analogous to the
facts in Graham.
The dissent opined further that even if the claim for wrongful dis-
charge allows for constructive discharge, the plaintiff did not offer
enough evidence to survive a directed verdict.8" The dissent raised
key points in the defendant's evidence: the plaintiff did not give notice
of the harassment until October 26, 1999; Harris Teeter took immedi-
ate action; Schultz was accepted into the management program before
the allegations arose; the allegations were the first of their kind
against Schultz; Harris Teeter offered to transfer the plaintiff; and the
absence of reports of sexual harassment to Harris Teeter for January
and February.81 Judge McCullough concluded that the plaintiff could
74. Id.
75. Id. at 159.
76. Id. (quoting Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. 1989)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 159-160.
80. Id. at 160-161.
81. Id. at 161-162.
9
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not meet the "deliberateness" element of constructive discharge set
out in Graham.8
2
ANALYSIS
The North Carolina judicial system has generally been wary of im-
posing changes that substantially affect policy, asserting that the legis-
lature is best equipped to handle those duties.83 Given this reluctance,
it seems surprising that the court felt it was appropriate to recognize
constructive discharge. However, the justification and standing for
imposing the change can be found in the reasoning from Coman.
In Coman, the court reasoned that the court, and not the legisla-
ture, first adopted the employment at-will doctrine; therefore, the
North Carolina Supreme Court found that it would be "entirely ap-
propriate" for the courts to further interpret the rule.84 The Coman
court also emphasized that it was not creating new policy, but allowing
an exception to at-will employment in light of already existing
policy.85
The logical reaction to the Whitt decision is an expectation of an
increased number of claims. The Coman court anticipated this reac-
tion and responded:
In reaching our decision today, we have not turned a deaf ear to the
warning that we may have spawned a deluge of spurious claims. Our
courts have abundant authority to protect employers from frivolous
claims, particularly by imposition of sanctions against attorneys and
parties pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
86
Given that these justifications and responses still ring true today with
the employment at-will doctrine, the normal reluctance of the North
Carolina courts is appropriately addressed by Coman.
In Whitt, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided to use the
Fourth Circuit standards for establishing constructive discharge.87
This was foreseeable considering that the North Carolina Court of
Appeals looked at the same standards in Graham, and the Fourth Cir-
82. Id. at 162.
83. North Carolina is one of the few states to recognize contributory negligence (See Smith
v. Norfolk & S. R.R. Co., 114 N.C. 728 (1894)), alienation of affections (See Henson v. Thomas,
56 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1949) (Seawell, J., dissenting) ("We cannot, with any propriety, refer these
matters to the Legislature as being the appropriate department to deal with them. This has been
done so often that the formula has become a clichd. The Legislature may have sins of its own for
which it must do penance, but it is not a scapegoat for the judiciary."), and has even declined to
decide whether not wearing an automobile seat belt would constitute negligence (See Miller v.
Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968)).
84. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 448 n.3 (N.C. 1989).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 449.
87. Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 151, 158 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
2004]
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cuit standards have been published in the North Carolina Model Jury
Instructions for Civil Cases since at least 1991.88 Furthermore, other
state courts that have considered the issue have successfully adopted
the relevant circuit court standard, relying on the circuit's broad range
of case law interpretations.8 9 By adopting the applicable circuit stan-
dard, the state ensures uniform results regardless of the forum or the
law the plaintiff chooses.
However, the choice of the standard should not necessarily be auto-
matic. At this point, the North Carolina courts need to decide
whether to adopt the Fourth Circuit's stringent standards of construc-
tive discharge. The Fourth Circuit's standard of constructive dis-
charge has been well established as one of the most, if not the most,
stringent standards of the constructive discharge variations. 9° While
this news may comfort employers, an appropriate constructive dis-
charge doctrine must balance the interests of the accused, the accuser,
and the employer:
The victim has an interest in not having to run a daily gauntlet of un-
welcome pressures and advances at work. The accused also has an
interest, however, in not losing a job or reputation on the basis of an
accusation which turns out to be mistaken or downright false. The
rule of law must reflect some equation of interests in a controversy.91
In Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., a flagship case for constructive dis-
charge in the Fourth Circuit, the court reversed the district court's de-
nial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict stating,
"While we are mindful of the deference due a jury verdict, after re-
viewing the evidence we are convinced that defendant's motion for
judgment n.o.v should have been granted."92 The court held that a
constructive discharge occurs when the employer deliberately makes
the employment conditions so intolerable that it forces the employee
to quit his job.9 3 Deliberateness is characterized by intentional con-
duct aimed at forcing that particular employee to quit.94 It could be
88. Id.; Graham v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 465 S.E.2d 558, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (quot-
ing E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992)); N.C.P.I- Civil 640.02 Gen-
eral Civil Volume (May 1991) (The footnote in the model jury instructions states, "No reported
North Carolina appellate decision appears to have dealt directly with constructive termination
.... The most instructive source of law for the purposes of this instruction is Bristow v. Bailey
[sic] Press, Inc .... (citations omitted)).
89. R. Pepper Crutcher, Jr. & Phelps Dunbar, Constructive Discharge: What it is, and What
it isn't, in Mississippi Employment Law, 21 Miss. C. L. REV. 1 (2001).
90. Cathy Shuck, That's it, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge
Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 444 (2002); David L. Gregory & Laura Hess,
Constructive Discharge: Easier Said Than Done, 2 EMPLOYEE RIo-rrs QUARTERLY 69, 71 (2002).
91. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 115 (4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson, J. dissenting) (2-1
decision regarding constructive discharge).
92. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1252 (4th Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 1255.
94. Id.
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inferred by circumstantial evidence, including failure to act in the face
of intolerable conditions.95 Intolerability of working conditions is
gauged by whether a reasonable person in the employee's situation
would have felt compelled to resign.96 The Bristow elements are rou-
tinely cited in other cases and are even used in the North Carolina
Model Jury Instructions.97
The deliberateness or intent requirement of Bristow has been criti-
cized as harsh.98 The Fourth Circuit has knowingly adopted this view
stating that "[t]he majority of Circuits focus almost exclusively on the
effect an employer's actions have on an employee .... The minority
view, to which we subscribe, is that a plaintiff must also prove that the
actions complained of were intended by the employer as an effort to
force the employee to quit."9 9
There have been several frustrations in the deliberateness require-
ment, not only for its high burden, but also in the difficulty in inter-
preting the circumstantial evidence to show subjective intent. The
contentious decisions in Paroline v. Unisys Corp. focused on the em-
ployer's intent to cause her resignation. 100 In that case, the defendant
company reprimanded the accused employee, delayed his promotion
and raise, ordered him to limit his exposure to female employees, re-
voked his security clearance, and ordered him to get counseling.0 1
The defendant also asked the victim not to quit and offered her two
weeks off to recover." 2 In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor
of the employer on the constructive discharge claim. In a 5-4 decision
in banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed and affirmed the district court's
summary judgment decision."0 3 With each Paroline decision, the ap-
pellate court reversed the order of the previous court. Both appellate
decisions were decided by the closest margin. Clearly, in many of the
difficult cases, the standard is producing different results from learned
judges.
Due to a United States Supreme Court decision and the Fourth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of it, the victim has another hurdle to pass in or-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. N.C.P.I- Civil 640.02 General Civil Volume (May 1991).
98. Shuck, supra note 90, at 444; Gregory & Hess, supra note 90, at 71.
99. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
100. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 109-110 (4th Cir 1989) (2-1 decision regarding
constructive discharge) (Wilkinson, J. dissenting); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27, 27-8
(4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (5-4 decision).
101. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 103.
102. Id. at 104.
103. Paroline, 900 F.2d at 27.
20041
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der to hold the employer vicariously liable for the actions of its
agent.'i n In Burlington Industries, Co. v. Ellerth,1 °5 the Supreme
Court enacted a seemingly fair affirmative defense for an employer
who had not taken any "tangible employment action" in order to
avoid vicarious liability of a supervisory employee. The Court recog-
nized that simply because a person is a supervisor, that fact alone
should not automatically impose vicarious liability on the employer:
"A co-worker can break a co-worker's arm as easily as a supervisor,
and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can inflict psy-
chological injuries by his or her offensive conduct." 106 These "tangi-
ble employment actions" are powers given to the supervisor by the
employer, which include hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign-
ment with significantly different responsibilities, or a significant
change in benefits.10 7 The agency relationship of the employer and
supervisor, characterized by the power to take these tangible employ-
ment actions, imposes liability on the employer when the agent uses
those powers inappropriately. 10 8 This "tangible employment action"
is similar to the "aided by agency" doctrine that has been used mainly
for fraud cases and has only been recently adopted for sexual harass-
ment cases. 0 9
If a supervisory employee has not taken a tangible employment ac-
tion with respect to an alleged victim-employee, the employer is enti-
tled to an affirmative defense to avoid vicarious liability if harassment
is found. 10 The affirmative defense consists of two necessary ele-
ments: 1) reasonable care by the employer to prevent or eliminate any
harassing behavior; and 2) an unreasonable failure of the plaintiff to
take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer."1 ' The employer needs to prove these two elements
by a preponderance of the evidence.' 12 While this rule seems to ade-
quately balance the issues of protecting the employer and the accessi-
bility of the suit for the victim, the interpretation of what is a tangible
employment action impacts the balance of these two issues. Some
federal courts, including district courts within the Fourth Circuit, have
104. Shuck, supra note 90, at 440-441.
105. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
106. Id. at 762 (1998) (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 761.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
109. J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND THE LLC: THE
LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 100 (6th ed. Abridged, Matthew Bender &
Co. 2003) (1998).
110. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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increased the difficulty for the victim in establishing a valid claim by
limiting what can be construed as a tangible employment action.
The interpretation rests on whether constructive discharge is a tan-
gible employment action. The Second Circuit and district courts
within the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have reasoned that because the
employer does not endorse a constructive discharge, it does not meet
the Ellerth definition of a tangible employment action.1 3 The Third
Circuit and district courts in the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have expressly stated that a constructive discharge amounts to a tangi-
ble employment action. 1 4 These courts view constructive discharge
as an employer's affirmative act, which equates to a discharge.11 5
Thus, in these circuits a constructive discharge is a tangible employ-
ment action.1 16
One of the most recent Fourth Circuit cases confirmed its interpre-
tation of the Ellerth holding as it applies to hostile work environment
cases. 117 It found that the employer defendant, BFI Waste Services,
had not taken any tangible employment action such as reduction in
pay, reassignment of tasks or demotion." 8 Thus, BFI Waste Services
was allowed to raise an affirmative defense to avoid imputed liability
by proving the exercise of reasonable care to correct harassing behav-
ior and that the plaintiff did not take advantage of those corrective
opportunities. 19
Problems occur when reviewing the intent/deliberateness standard
with the Ellerth interpretation. A situation could occur in which a
victim could prove that the supervisor had actively made the victim's
workplace unbearable with the intention of forcing the victim's resig-
nation, but would not be able to prove that the employer was vicari-
ously liable. Taking this scenario to the extreme, the employer could
avoid liability for its supervisor's actions by turning a blind eye to the
victim's situation until the victim actively used any formal processes to
inform upper management. This would decrease the incentives for the
employer to be truly proactive in preventing discrimination. Further,
by concentrating on the intent to force the employee to quit, the
113. Shuck, supra note 90, at 440; Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294
(2d Cir. 1999); Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (D.S.C. 1999); Alberter v. Mc-
Donald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (D. Nev. 1999).
114. Shuck, supra note 90, at 442; Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001);
Galloway v. Matagorda Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 952, 957 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101
F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170-71 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379,
1383 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
115. Shuck, supra note 90, at 442.
116. Id.
117. White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 299 (4th Cir. 2004).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Fourth Circuit's standard is unwieldy and cumbersome when a har-
asser does not want the victim to quit so that the harasser can continue
with the inappropriate behavior. 121
When adopting the doctrine of constructive discharge, state courts
are not bound by any federal circuit precedent. For instance, the Cali-
fornia courts have established significant new interpretations on con-
structive discharge, rejecting the Ninth Circuit standards. 21 Creating
new standards inevitably requires more judicial involvement to clarify
issues than adopting the standards of a current system. However, cre-
ating the new standard allows the court to adopt precise and clear
standards to avoid difficult, contradictory precedent and to fully bene-
fit from hindsight.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has taken a strong step to-
wards enforcing public policy in employment law. By officially recog-
nizing the possibilities for constructive discharge, employers are
further encouraged to monitor and address the employment environ-
ment to ensure against discrimination based on age, sex or race. How-
ever, the appellate courts of North Carolina should use this
opportunity to adopt a standard that adequately balances the interests
of the employer, supervisor, and victim.1 22 Abruptly adopting the
Fourth Circuit standard, as it seems the court of appeals did in Whitt,
is a lost opportunity to bring better clarity, vision, and justice to an
often-muddled doctrine. Because this is a common law doctrine, the
courts can freely make adjustments. As they face more complicated
cases, the courts will hopefully develop and create a better, clearer
standard for both the employers and employees of North Carolina.
120. In these cases, the Fourth Circuit adopts a reasonably foreseeable analysis to determine
if the employer had the requisite intent. This analysis has also been criticized. See Steven D.
Underwood, Constructive Discharge and the Employer's State of Mind: A Practical Standard, 1
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 343, 358 (1998).
121. Brady v. Elixir Indus., 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Turner v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994).
122. The North Carolina Supreme Court has the opportunity to review the standard set in
the court of appeals decision. On August 10th, 2004, defendant Harris Teeter, Inc. filed a notice
of appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court based on the dissenting opinion in the court of
appeals case and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 and N.C.R. App. P. 14 (b)(1). Notice of
Appeal at 1-2, Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 416A04).
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